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This is a short, admirably lucid, introduction to the philosophy of art centred 
around the question “What is Art?” Warburton follows tradition in 
understanding this Socratic question as a demand for the nature or essence of 
art; or, in modern analytic terms, the specification of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to count as a work of art. The book aims 
“to lay bare a range of indefensible positions, revealing the counter-arguments 
and counter-examples that undermine these positions” (p. 4). After a brief 
opening chapter on the relation of the art question to philosophy, Warburton 
discusses in successive chapters, the limitations and inadequacies of Clive 
Bell’s Theory of Significant Form, R.G. Collingwood’s Expressive Theory, the 
Family Resemblance Theory of Morris Weitz, and the Institutional Theory of 
George Dickie. The book ends by casting doubt on whether art has an essence 
at all, and so, on the whole project of pursuing the art question. 
Despite the freshness and ease of the writing style, the approach is rather 
hackneyed. Although Warburton does a good job of summarizing the relevant 
theories, particularly Collingwood, the book cannot help but strike one as a 
rehearsal of all too familiar criticisms of an all too familiar project. Surely we 
know by now that essentialist definitions in any area of philosophy confront a 
dilemma: either they are trivial, or false. One horn is the danger of vicious 
circularity, defining the key concept narrowly in terms that simply presuppose 
it e.g. art – significant form – that which produces aesthetic emotion. The other 
horn is the threat of drawing the wrong boundary, say, by excluding genuine 
artworks and/or including within the category of art objects that it seems 
implausible to count as such. Unsurprisingly, Warburton’s critique takes the 
form of pinning his victims on one or other of these horns. So why ask “the art 
question”? One might be forgiven for thinking that Warburton thinks the 
search for a strict definition of art is the first, or perhaps the only, question that 
matters in reflecting upon art philosophically. But in the final chapter – aptly, 
but puzzlingly, titled “So What?” – Warburton shows his hand by concluding 
that the search for an all-encompassing definition of art is a waste of time. It is 
“probably not answerable” (p. 133) and “almost certainly a futile [pursuit]” (p. 
126). Philosophers who engage in this fruitless quest are criticized for being 
more concerned for “crossword-puzzle-like technicalities” (p. 133) than the 
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actual role of art in our lives. Then why on earth devote a book to it, even if it 
is only an introduction? 
Warburton’s only motivation for pursuing the art question is that it 
is ”so puzzling” (p. 4). Really? He adds that “anxious objects” like Duchamp’s 
Fountain or Warhol’s Brillo Boxes obviously raise this question. Do they? I 
would have thought they raise a quite different question, namely, “Why is this 
object a work of art?” Given that this is precisely the sort of question that 
Warburton thinks ought to replace the art question (see ch.5), we are left 
without any interesting motivation for considering it at such length. A deeper 
question is why philosophers have wanted a definition of the essence of art. To 
his credit, Warburton does briefly take up this issue, offering three suggestions: 
1) to help decide difficult cases; 2) to explain why something that is called art 
is art; and 3) to tell us which objects are likely to repay close attention. What 
goes missing here is that a definition alone could not possibly achieve any of 
these things without being applied in the right way and, in order that that be 
done, one must have, and be able to make sense of, one’s experience of 
putative artworks. Here, I suggest, is the underlying motivation for the 
definition project: a definition seems to (but, of course, ultimately cannot) 
allow us to avoid responsibility for having to rely on, and articulate, our own 
experience of objects that we suppose are aspiring to the category of art. 
Experience is the indispensable basis of our reflections about art. 
Ultimately Warburton enjoins us to do something this book only 
attempts in order to provide a few counter-examples: to “turn back” to consider 
particular real works of art, their local features and specific values. I was 
surprised to find Warburton eventually endorsing a neo-Wittgensteinian 
approach to aesthetics, revealing that, for all his criticisms, he is much closer to 
Weitz than any of the other thinkers he discusses. The only significant 
difference being that whereas Weitz regards the definition project as a logical 
mistake, Warburton sees it as simply unlikely to yield satisfying results. Given 
that, I found most of Warburton’s criticisms of Weitz’s idea that art might be 
accounted for by a family of overlapping resemblances disingenuous. The 
point of this Wittgensteinian idea is not simply to offer a way of thinking that 
does not require commitment to art’s having an essence (in some 
philosophically loaded sense). It is also, and importantly, to challenge the 
explanatory project of essentialism, the idea that philosophy must explain in 
some entirely general way why anything that counts as art does so. Warburton 
criticizes Weitz for offering “no scheme for deciding what is to count as a 
relevant resemblance” (p. 81), hence what is to count as art, despite being well 
aware (see p. 122) that this approach rejects the view that it is the task of 
philosophy to provide any such general decision procedure. 
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As an exercise in philosophical analysis, it is salutary to run through the 
misguided attempts to define art. On that ground this book would be a valuable 
component in an introductory class on the philosophy of art – provided it was 
supplemented with additional reading materials pursuing other questions. 
Warburton’s final image of essentialist thinking as a largely unilluminating 
project far removed from any genuine appreciation or engaged criticism of art, 
shows that the value of this book lies primarily in its valedictory character, a 
swan song for the art question within the philosophy of art. 
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